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"Come the Millennium,. " So began a common form for
expressing a wish, when I was young. Often these words intro-
duced an aspiration that was understood by speaker and listener
alike to be utopian, a lovely but impossible dream. "Come the
Millennium," we might have said, "all Americans will enjoy free-
dom from want."1
All the authors in this symposium have come to bury pov-
erty, not to praise it-and yet we are far from agreement as to
poverty's causes and potential cures.2 In this venue, I offer three
short (and related) essays. First, I discuss the ways in which pov-
erty can dilute the value of clearly established constitutional lib-
erties. Illustrations are drawn from the rights protecting family
relationships and the freedoms of reproductive choice. Second,
I discuss the links between poverty and race in American politics
and constitutional law. Central here are the unwillingness of the
Supreme Court to take note of the interconnection of public and
private actions in maintaining systemic severe inequalities and
our persistent incapacity to muster the political will to respond
directly to the poverty of our core cities. Third, with the Millen-
nium not yet in sight, I offer two views of the law and politics of
* David G. Price and Dallas P. Price Professor of Law Emeritus, Univer-
sity of California, Los Angeles. Professor Karst is the author of numerous arti-
cles and books, including LAW'S PROMISE, LAW'S ExPRESSION: VISIONS OF POWER
IN THE POLITICS OF GENDER, RACE AND RELIGION (1993) and BELONGING TO
AMERICA: EQuAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUrION (1989), which received the
James A. Rawley Prize from the American Organization of Historians for "the
best book on race relations in the United States." He is co-editor of THE ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTrrTION (2d ed. 2000).
1. The term "freedom from want" was coined by Franklin Roosevelt in a
1941 address to Congress, and the words were also included in the Atlantic
Charter. See THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 706 (2d ed. 1956).
2. I write this statement when I have seen nothing more than a list of
authors.
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economic inequality. As to law, I suggest that a modest extension
of equal protection doctrine, suited to alleviating some forms of
poverty, would lie well within the ability of our courts to manage.
Then, as to politics, I consider whether some kinds of anti-pov-
erty legislation may still lie within the realm of realistic
possibility.
I. POVERTY AND THE DEVALUATION OF LIBERTIES: FAMILY
RELATIONSHIPS AND REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM
It is a clich6 that legal rights are valuable mainly to those
who can afford to take advantage of them. The "freedom of the
seas"' recognized by international law historically has benefited-
indeed, was invented by-the nations that had large fleets, which
is to say European colonial powers. In our own time, the "free-
dom of the press" is mainly invoked by the large enterprises that
own and operate the media of mass communications.3 Given the
capitalization required to exercise freedoms such as these, it
would seem strained to say that poverty is denying some Ameri-
cans the freedom of the seas recognized by international law or
the freedom of the press guaranteed by the First Amendment.
Some constitutional liberties, however, not only are highly indi-
vidualized as a matter of theory but also offer a realistic expecta-
tion that they can be exercised by ordinary Americans who are
not poor. Notable examples are the applications of the Four-
teenth Amendment to protect choices to create or maintain fam-
ily relationships and the freedom of reproductive choice. Here it
is plain that, absent a legislative orjudicial mandate for a subsidy,
poverty may well impede-or even prevent-the translation of a
theoretical liberty into a reality.
Hardly anyone denies that poverty obstructs the exercise of
citizenship-that is, participation in the public life of the com-
munity as a respected, responsible member.4 Yet, not since the
end of the Warren era has the Supreme Court shown any genera-
3. See, e.g., Owen Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IowA L. REV. 1405
(1986); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH
(1993).
4. William Forbath has given this proposition its most compelling recent
elucidation. William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L.
REv. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Forbath, Caste, Class]; William E. Forbath, Constitu-
tional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique and Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REv.
1821 (2001). Earlier large-scale treatments of the theme include Frank I.
Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7 (1969) and Peter B.
Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39
HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1987). See also KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA:
EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION 125-46 (1989).
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lized interest in interpreting the Constitution to oblige govern-
ment to provide remedies for poverty.5 In the last three decades,
however, while advocates of this millennial constitutional goal
saw it receding from view, the Court has relied on the Fourteenth
Amendment to mandate a number of legislative accommoda-
tions to facilitate poor people's choices about family relation-
ships. A divorced father who was unable to keep up his child
support payments had a constitutional right to remarry, despite a
state law conditioning the remarriage on his making the past-due
payments.6 The decision was explained on equal protection
grounds but could just as easily have been rested on the freedom
to marry which, the Court had recently held, was a (substantive)
due process liberty.7 Sometimes the constitutional right in ques-
tion is not just a "negative" freedom of an indigent from regula-
tion but in practical effect, a right to a state subsidy. Thus, a
person too poor to afford the filing fee nonetheless had a (proce-
dural) due process right of access to a divorce court.' An indi-
gent man sued in a paternity action had a similar (procedural)
due process right to a blood-grouping test subsidized by the
state.' And an indigent mother subject to a trial court's order
terminating her parental rights was constitutionally entitled to a
state-subsidized trial transcript when her right to appeal from the
termination order was conditioned on her supplying a
transcript. 10
In giving special constitutional protection to family relation-
ships, the Court is following its own statements in the 1920s
embracing a fundamental constitutional liberty "to marry, estab-
lish a home and bring up children."'" The modern decisions
take a second step, holding that the making or termination of a
marriage and the determination of a parent-child relationship
are so fundamental as to justify an exemption for indigents from
a barrier imposed by state law, and a third step, sometimes
5. The decision that marked the end of the Court's brief essay into this
field was Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). See discussion infra note 79.
6. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
7. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
8. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). There were overtones of
the substantive due process right to marry, as well. After all, for a person who is
presently married, divorce will be a necessary precondition for marrying some-
one else.
9. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981).
10. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996). The Court saw no reason to
specify whether this decision rested on due process or equal protection
grounds, or both.
11. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). See also Pierce v. Soc'y
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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imposing an affirmative state obligation to make up for an indi-
vidual's poverty by assuring access to a fair judicial proceeding
that will determine the indigent's marital or paternal status.1 2
So far, so good. But if we change the setting only slightly, it
becomes plain that poverty itself can be a severe burden on a
parent's constitutional right to preserve the parent-child relation-
ship. Now imagine a young single mother, living in poverty with
her child, in a neighborhood where poverty is concentrated. If
this description is enough to set you imagining the neighbor-
hood and the mother's face, the chances are that your mind's
eye envisions an inner-city street and a woman with a dark com-
plexion. 3 If her poverty is so severe that the child is poorly fed
and clothed for a time-and especially if she is, indeed, black-
she runs a risk that her parental rights will be terminated by the
state for "neglect," and that the child will be placed with an adop-
tive family. The large majority of termination cases are founded
on findings of neglect (as opposed to, say, physical abuse).
These findings are correlated with poverty to a striking degree,
and one justifiable worry is that racial stereotyping may play a
role in characterizing poor young black single mothers as unfit.'4
We shall return to the interplay of race and poverty in the next
essay; for now it will suffice to take note that even so fundamental
a constitutional freedom as the right of a parent to bring up his
or her child can be undermined when poverty is severe.
Like marriage and parental relations, "procreation" had
been identified by the Supreme Court as a fundamental personal
liberty well before its modern recognition of broad rights of pro-
creative choice. In 1942, the Court held invalid a state law select-
ing some, but not all, three-time felons for compulsory
sterilization.1" But what of a right to choose not to procreate?
12. The Supreme Court further suggested in 1981, that in some cases
brought by a state to terminate parental status, the state may have a constitu-
tional obligation to employ counsel for the defendant parents. This right
attaches only when the proceeding would be fundamentally unfair without the
participation of defense counsel-presumably when important factual allega-
tions are contested, or the case presents disputed and important points of law.
Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
13. See generally JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: How RAcIsM
UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY (1994); MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS
HATE WELFARE 102-32 (1999).
14. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Is There Justice in Children's Rights?: The
Critique of Federal Family Preservation Policy, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 112 (1995).
15. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Although a substantive
due process ground was plainly available, the stated ground was equal protec-
tion; the Court said that, given the fundamental nature of the liberty in ques-
tion, the law must survive strict judicial scrutiny of its selection among felons to
be sterilized. No such justification was offered.
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Connecticut was one of the states that forbade the use of contra-
ceptive devices as a means of birth control. Even so, doctors had
been prescribing methods of contraception, and drug stores had
openly sold contraceptive devices-all without evoking any
response from the police. Only when a birth control clinic
opened its doors did the police bring a charge of violation of the
state law.16 The resulting conviction was held unconstitutional in
Griswold v. Connecticut.
17
It is notable that this decision, which opened the modern
era for constitutional rights of reproductive choice, principally
benefited women of limited means. The Griswold opinion, of
course, said not a word about such women, but spoke generally
in the language of privacy of the marital relationship. This form
of constitutional privacy, said the Court, surely included power to
make the intimate decision whether to practice contraception.
But it was chiefly women who were less well-to-do who needed to
rely on the clinic for assistance in exercising their choices about
reproduction. Middle-class women not only had access to private
physicians but could easily find advice about methods of contra-
ception by traveling to another state-for example, New York-
where such advice was entirely lawful. Griswold extended the
right of reproductive choice to women of a less advantaged
class-and I do mean economic class.
Within a decade, the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade,"s
extending the right of reproductive choice to a woman's decision
whether to terminate a pregnancy. Although this right remains
under attack, especially by those who see abortion as murder, the
right has, for the most part, survived legislative efforts to nullify
it. After seeming to move toward overruling Roe, the Court in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey19 reaffirmed Roe's "core meaning:" Up
to the point of fetal viability, a woman has a constitutional liberty
to end her pregnancy, and a law that imposes an "undue burden"
on this right is unconstitutional. Yet, those who would celebrate
16. In Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), the Supreme Court had held
that a challenge to the same law was not justiciable, because of the persistent
failure of the state to enforce it. That decision led directly to the founding of
the clinic whose operators were prosecuted. The full story is told in FRED
FRIENDLY, THE CONSTITUTION: THAT DELICATE BALANCE 189-208 (1984).
17. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
18. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
19. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Here I refer to the plurality opinion of Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, which has been taken, since 1992, as a state-
ment of the governing law. Justice O'Connor is widely believed to be the
author of the portions of this opinion applying the "undue burden" standard.
That standard was first proposed in her dissent in Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Repro-
ductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
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this reaffirmation of reproductive freedom should ask themselves
whether poor women are able to exercise it. Does women's pov-
erty bear on the determination of an "undue burden" on the
right of abortion choice? The only restriction on abortion held
invalid in Casey was one requiring prior notice to a woman's hus-
band before she could obtain an abortion. Part of the justifica-
tion for holding that this law unduly burdened a woman's choice
to have an abortion was that, for a significant number of women,
the likely response to such a notification would be spousal abuse.
The plurality opinion noted that many abused women have little
option but to stay with their abusers, even when further abuse
seems probable, "in large part because they have no other source
of income."2 ° These women's vulnerability to abuse was an
important factor in the decision, for "[I]egislation is measured
[for undue burden on abortion choice by] its impact on those
whose conduct it affects."2
Remarkably, though, the same opinion upheld a law requir-
ing a twenty-four hour waiting period between the doctor's provi-
sion of information (said to be aimed at informing the woman's
choice about abortion) and the time the abortion was per-
formed-and this in spite of lower court findings that having to
make two visits to the doctor's office would particularly burden
women with the fewest financial resources, some of whom had to
travel long distances to reach the doctor.22 "On the record
before us," said the Casey plurality, this waiting period was not
shown to be a substantial obstacle to such women's liberty of
abortion choice.2" Added cost, the plurality made clear, was not,
by itself, enough to constitute an "undue burden," but they went
on to say that "at some point increased cost could become a sub-
stantial obstacle.
24
The Court has not yet given full consideration to the effects
of women's poverty on this "undue burden" issue. Within that
subject, one extremely important question looms: Can a state
constitutionally require an abortion to be performed in a hospi-
tal? It is no exaggeration to say that, for women of limited
means, protecting any effective right of abortion choice requires
access to birth control clinics. Middle-class women continue to
have access to private doctors-and, if the need should arise,
20. 505 U.S. at 892.
21. 505 U.S. at 894.
22. For example, a woman of reduced means may suffer hardship from
having to take two days off from work rather than one and from doubled costs
of transportation and childcare.
23. 505 U.S. at 887.
24. 505 U.S. at 901.
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they can fly to New York or California to have abortions there. It
is still the most vulnerable women-those who live in hardship,
for example, or those who are young with no resources of their
own and fearful of their fathers' wraths-who need the clinics if
they are to exercise the right of reproductive choice. Only 7% of
abortions are performed in hospitals; the other 93% are per-
formed in clinics and other outpatient facilities, or in doctors'
offices. Part of the reason for this great disparity is that the cost
of hospital services far exceeds the cost of non-hospital services-
in one study, by a factor of six.2 In 1983, the Court held uncon-
stitutional a state law requiring second trimester abortions to be
performed in hospitals on just this ground.26 But Justice
O'Connor dissented from this holding, in an opinion that was
dismissive of this concern of women of limited means. The
requirement of a hospital, she said, was a "health regulation" and
was not an "official interference" with the abortion decision.
27
The latter point was asserted, not demonstrated. Even more star-
ling is the opinion's curt tone, which just does not sound like
the same Justice O'Connor who contributed to the Casey
plurality.
Perhaps, in 1992, she was no longer quite the same Justice
O'Connor she was in 1983. Her reluctance to overrule Roe v.
Wade around that time seems significant.28 Roe's main influence
in women's lives had been to extend to women of modest means
a control over their maternity that their more affluent sisters
already had. It is still true, for women of lesser means, that access
to the clinics is crucial to their right of choice; disabling the clin-
ics would throw away Roe's principal effect on real women's lives.
Perhaps Justice O'Connor has reconsidered the meaning of
"undue burden" in the years since Akron. In 1991 in Rust v. Sulli-
van,29 she not only refused to join in overruling Roe, but she also
concluded that an administrative "gag order" forbidding abor-
25. See Stanley K Henshaw, The Accessibility of Abortion Services in the United
States, 23 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 246 (1991) (hospital average for first-
trimester abortions: $1,757; non-hospital average: $288). Cost aside, a hospital
abortion may not be available at all, either because the nearest hospital is far
away or because the hospital has been acquired by a religious institution that
will not permit abortions. From 1988 to 1992, the number of U.S. hospitals
providing abortions decreased by 18%. Stanley K. Henshaw &J. Van Volt, Abor-
tion Services in the United States, 1991 and 1992, 26 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES
100 (1994).
26. See Akron, supra note 19.
27. 462 U.S. at 467 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
28. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 522
(1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
29. 500 U.S. 173, 223-24 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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tion counseling in federally-funded family-planning clinics had
not been authorized by Congress.3 ° And she has consistently
voted to uphold legislation and court orders offering protection
for clinic patrons against the most intimidating forms of harass-
ment by "pro-life" demonstrators.31 So, there are straws in the
wind suggesting that Justice O'Connor may have a different view
today of efforts to cancel Roe's main practical effect by putting
the clinics out of business. 2 Still, a reaffirmance of Akron's pro-
tection of the clinics is no sure thing.
Even in a clinic, exercising the constitutional right to choose
to have an abortion typically costs money-enough money to
price the procedure beyond the range of most women living in
hardship. The Court has held that the Constitution is indifferent
to those women's plight, offering freedom from direct govern-
mental interference with the choice to have an abortion, but no
claim of a right to governmental support of an abortion, even
when government is supporting the (considerably greater) cost
of childbirth.33 Because public aid is so great a proportion of
poor women's resources, the refusal of public aid for abortion is
quite likely to deprive a poor woman of any "choice" to undergo
the procedure.34 About one-third of the states (including New
30. This gag order was later rescinded. On the special relevance to black
women of access to clinics in order to get information about family planning,
including information about abortion, see generally Dorothy E. Roberts, Rust v.
Sullivan and the Control of Knowledge, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 587 (1993).
31. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994); Schenck v.
Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357 (1997); Hill v. Colo-
rado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
32. A straw blowing in the opposite direction is the Court's refusal to
review a Fourth Circuit decision upholding (by a 2-1 vote) South Carolina's
hostile regulations of outpatient abortions in clinics and in doctors' offices.
These astonishingly severe, nit-picking regulations were plainly designed to
increase the difficulty of operating a clinic or performing abortions in a doc-
tor's office and to increase the costs of abortion. After a six-day trial, the district
court struck down the regulations as an undue burden on women's reproduc-
tive choice; in a ninety-four page opinion, the district court meticulously found
facts demonstrating the pointless severity of one after another requirement set
out in the regulations. The Fourth Circuit majority managed to reverse without
questioning any of these findings. Greenville Women's Clinic v. Bryant, 222
F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1191 (2001). Anyone who reads
the majority's bland and blinkered opinion should also get the facts of the case.
They are to be found in the district court's opinion, 66 F. Supp.2d 691 (D.S.C.
1999), and in Judge Hamilton's trenchant dissent. Greenville Women's Clinic, 222
F.3d at 175 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
33. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980).
34. Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court on Abortion: A Survey, in ABORTION,
MEICINE AND THE LAw 161, 172-73 (J. Douglas Butler & David F. Walbert eds.,
POVERTY AND RIGHTS
York and California) offer poor women state funding for medi-
cally-necessary abortions. Elsewhere, some women in poverty are
lucky enough to find private institutional support for the proce-
dure, but others can dredge up the money for an abortion only
by depriving themselves and their children of adequate nutri-
tion. The result is that large numbers of them simply carry their
unintended and unwanted pregnancies to term.35 Still others,
desperate at the thought of a responsibility for parenthood
utterly beyond their means to fulfill, seek to abort their
pregnancies themselves; some of these-only a few, but one is
too many-have died in the attempt or been maimed for life.3 6
These restrictions on the exercise of the constitutional right of
procreative choice should trouble anyone who claims to believe
in "equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike."3
II. POVERTY AND THE AGGRAVATION OF RACIAL INEQUALITY:
FROM POLITICS TO LAW, AND BACK
Although a majority of all poor Americans are white, and
majorities among black and Latino Americans are not poor, the
subjects of poverty and race are inextricably connected in today's
politics. According to a 1994 poll, more than half of all Ameri-
cans believed, erroneously, that most people on welfare were
black.38 And about two-thirds of those who held this belief also
said-contrary to the evidence-that most people on welfare did
not really need it, did not want to work, and had only their own
lack of effort to blame for their condition. 9 Politicians have
seen these attitudes as defining a potential white constituency
3d ed. 1986); DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUC-
TION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 229-32, 296-98 (1997).
35. One 1980 study (called "rigorous") found that eighteen to twenty-
three percent of women on Medicaid who would prefer to have an abortion
carry their pregnancies to term. Another 1980 study placed the rate at thirty-
five percent. See Stanley K. Henshaw, Factors Hindering Access to Abortion Services,
27 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 54 (1995).
36. A 1979 study by the (then named) Center for Disease Control explic-
itly linked four deaths to the unavailability of Medicaid funding. Alan
Guttmacher Institute, Revisiting Public Funding of Abortion for Poor Women, at
http://www.agi-usa.org/pubs/ib fundingOO.html. In 1997, the Food and Drug
Administration warned consumers that kits for self-abortion, marketed on the
Internet, contained drugs not approved by the FDA, including one that can
cause ectopic pregnancy, abnormal pregnancy, or permanent damage to repro-
ductive organs. Health Notes, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, June 19, 1997, at A9.
37. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16 (1956).
38. GILENS, supra note 13, at 140 (quoting from a 1994 CBS/New York
Times poll that produced all these results). Much of his book is devoted to
refuting these myths and explaining their persistence.
39. Id. at 140.
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waiting to be mobilized. Part of the appeal of a political attack
on welfare has been that it is easily understood by the target con-
stituency as a coded reference to race.4 °
When a white observer identifies race with poverty, the iden-
tification can also lead to distortions in the other direction so
that undifferentiated references to black Americans can call up
fearsome images of "underclass" behavior:41 gangs, crime, drugs,
riots. So, "[t] he ghetto hurts all Blacks, notjust those entrapped
in it." 42 The classic story here features the black businessman,
dressed in his business suit, who has trouble getting a taxi in the
evening. Such fears for physical safety can translate into an asset
for those who would turn white racial anxieties to political advan-
tage-a tactic that began in the generations when Jim Crow held
sway. The more serious harm of the race/poverty identification,
however, is that it reinforces unconscious stereotypes of black
inferiority. This distortion, too, has its political implications, for
it can exacerbate anxieties about African Americans as potential
competitors-say, for jobs or for college admissions. By a stag-
gering illogic that finds its coherence in the realm of emotion,
the politics of affirmative action is a cousin to the politics of
welfare.
If many white citizens identify race with poverty, they do not
make the connection out of whole cloth. The proportion of
black Americans who are poor has been running for many years
at about three or more times the rate of poverty among whites,
with black unemployment persistently running around twice the
rate for whites.43 While poor white Americans are scattered
among center cities, suburbs, and rural areas, three out of five
poor black Americans live in the center cities,44 and many of
these neighborhoods are now areas of concentrated poverty.45 It
40. Elsewhere I have dealt with the anxiety-laden "social issues agenda"
for race. KENNETH L. KARST, LAW's PROMISE, LAW's EXPRESSION: VISIONS OF
POWER IN THE POLITICS OF GENDER, RACE, AND RELIGION 67-111, 137-46 (1993).
41. I use "underclass" not as a noun-no one is an underclass person-
but as an adjective, used by "outside" observers to describe behavior that they
see as deviant or threatening or both. On the distortions of "underclass" as a
noun describing deviant persons, see Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their
Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. L.J. 1499, 1507-08 (1991), and sources
cited.
42. DOUGLAS GLASGOW, THE BLACK UNDERCLASS: POVERTY, UNEMPLOY-
MENT, AND ENTRAPMENT OF GHETTO YOUTH X (1980).
43. See, e.g., ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE,
HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 100, 103 (1992).
44. Id. at 100.
45. On the concentration of poverty, see WILLtAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN
WoPRx DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR 11-17 passim (1996).
In 1990, among all Americans living in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty
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is these neighborhoods that produce the lion's share of media
images of "underclass" behavior.4 6 Life in such a neighborhood
undoubtedly acculturates the residents in ways that are harmful.
In taking account of this fact of our social life, I do not seek to
revive the "culture of poverty" idea, floated in the 1970s, which
suggested that something inherent in the culture of racial and
ethnic minorities was transmitting poverty from one generation
to the next.4 7 Nor do I accept the more recent version, with its
claim to include a "scientific" explanation: that minority children
inherit a genetic weakness that produces intergenerational wel-
fare dependency.48 Rather I am suggesting that poverty itself is a
powerful acculturating agent, and that one of its effects is to
worsen racial inequality. To put the same point in terms of con-
stitutional resonance, I am suggesting that living in a neighbor-
hood of concentrated poverty strongly tends to undermine one's
chances to enjoy the Fourteenth Amendment right of equal
citizenship.
To be an equal citizen, one must be treated by the organized
community as a respected, responsible, and participating mem-
ber.49 In America, one crucial arena for achieving respect is the
world of work.5 ° Success in this arena requires that decent jobs
(40% living at or below the poverty line), some 52% (over 4.1 million) were
black, with the other 48% about evenly divided between white and Latino.
INST. ON RACE & POVERTY, FINAL REPORT: EXAMINING THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN HOUSING, EDUCATION, AND PERSISTENT SEGREGATION 7 (2000), available
at http://wwwl.umn.edu/irp/publications/finall.htm.
46. GILENS, supra note 13, at 132, remarks:
For most Americans, the most powerful images of poverty are
undoubtedly the black urban ghettos. These concentrations of pov-
erty represent the worst failures of our economic, educational, and
social welfare systems. Yet they also represent a minuscule portion of
all the American poor. Only 6% of all poor Americans are blacks liv-
ing in ghettos.
For a review of recent evidence that the work ethic is very much alive among
recipients of public assistance, see JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, WE
THE POOR PEOPLE: WORK, POVERTY, AND WELFARE 44-53 (1997).
47. E.g., Oscar Lewis, The Culture of Poverty, in ON UNDERSTANDING POV-
ERTY: PERSPECTrIVES FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 187 (Daniel Patrick Moynihan
ed., 1968); OSCAR LEWIS, LA VIDA: A PUERTO RICAN FAMILY IN THE CULTURE OF
POVERTY-SAN JUAN AND NEW YORK (1966).
48. RICHARDJ. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLI-
GENCE AND CLASS IN AMERICAN LIFE 403 passim (1994). Wholly apart from the
genetic inheritance silliness, the idea that public assistance is intergenerational
has no factual basis. See HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 46 at 46-47.
49. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal
Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1, 5-11 (1977).
50. SeeJUDITH SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION
63-101 (1991); Forbath, Caste, Class, supra note 4; Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming
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be available and that workers be ambitious. Both of these ingre-
dients are undermined in today's urban neighborhoods of con-
centrated poverty. The low-skilled industrial jobs that once were
a first step on the economic ladder have either disappeared alto-
gether or moved beyond effective reach (to the far suburbs, to
Thailand). The jobs that remain for low-skilled workers are gen-
erally so poorly paid that they will not support a family; further,
they offer no security of employment, no health insurance, and
no pension benefits. 5I Lacking an economic basis for hope for
the future, young adults have little incentive to marry. For a
young man, illicit activities seem to promise ready cash. For a
young woman confronting an unplanned pregnancy, mother-
hood may be the only respected social role in view.5 2
Americans have historically looked to education as a path to
economic and social advancement. But the schools in areas of
concentrated poverty are poor in resources, and at every level
they are inadequate to cope with the failings of children's prior
education. Besides, with no decentjobs in sight for the children,
teachers and counselors face an uphill struggle as they try to per-
suade students even to stay in school, let alone strive for admis-
sion to college. If "underclass" behavior is a significant feature of
such a neighborhood, the primary determinant is not a defect in
black culture, but a vicious cycle: the absence of decent employ-
ment opportunity is demoralizing to individual ambition, and
tends to deflect both young men and young women into risky
behavior that digs them-and their community-deeper into
poverty. In turn, the community's widespread demoralization
deters potential employers from locating there. When a low-
skilled adult manages to escape this cycle, it is impressive. When
a school child escapes, it is miraculous.
A market economy is, among other things, a system for mea-
suring values-notjust the values of goods, but the values of per-
sonal services-and, given the role of work in establishing
identities, the values of persons. The market teaches lessons
about individuals, lessons about who counts and who does not.
On this scale, from the early 1970s to the early 1990s the employ-
Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 523, 530-38
(1997).
51. See generally WILSON, supra note 45.
52. See Elijah Anderson, Neighborhood Effects on Teenage Pregnancy, in THE
URBAN UNDERCLASS 375, 382-90 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds.,
1991); KRISTIN LUKER, DUBIOUS CONCEPTIONS: THE POLITICS OF TEENAGE PREG,-
NANCY 71-76, 105-08, 113-28, 133 (1996); HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note
46, at 167-200; Roberts, supra note 14, at 117-22 (in context of Norplant
debate).
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ment market consistently taught the low-skilled poor that they
did not count-and their absorption of that lesson was a major
factor in their demoralization. An upturn in the 1990s brought a
measure of improvement for this group.53 Today, however, we
face not only a declining economy but also a global labor market
that portends drastically declining prospects for low-skilled
American workers. If history is to be our guide, we can predict
that African Americans in this group, having been the last hired
in the 1990s upturn, will be the first fired as the economy
declines. With the concentration of poverty in their urban
neighborhoods intensified, we can expect that young African
Americans will be further acculturated to "underclass" behavior.
And then, in the world outside the ghetto, we can expect a
heightened deployment of the politics of racial fear.
In its currently prevailing interpretations, American consti-
tutional law has little to say about any of these conditions-and
this even though the conditions, in the aggregate, deny the sub-
stance of equal citizenship to millions of Americans. In a num-
ber of cases, the Supreme Court has been confronted with
legislation that has produced racially disparate effects, and on
that basis has been challenged as unconstitutional racial discrimi-
nation. In these cases, the Court typically has rejected the chal-
lenge for want of proof of a governmental purpose to
disadvantage anyone on the basis of race. In Washington v.
Davis,54 the leading case in this group, the Court's opinion
makes clear the reason why the majority has adopted this limiting
principle:
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nev-
ertheless invalid, absent compelling justification, if in prac-
tice it benefits or burdens one race more than another
would be far-reaching and would raise serious questions
about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, wel-
fare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that
may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average
black than to the more affluent white .... [I]n our view,
extension of the rule beyond those areas where it is already
applicable by reason of statute ... should . . . await legisla-
tive prescription.55
53. See William Julius Wilson, The New Economy and Racial Inequality, 54
BuLL. AM. AcAD. OF ARTS AND SCIENCES, no. 4, 41, 45-46 (Summer 2001), at
http://www.amacad.org/blvlivn4/blvlivn441.htm. In the 1960s Bayard Rustin,
a prominent black labor leader, said, "We cannot have fair employment until
we have full employment." Forbath, Caste, Class, supra note 4, at 87.
54. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
55. 426 U.S. at 248.
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Or, a cynic might say: The inequalities resulting from his-
toric and continuing connections between race and poverty are
so deep and so wide-ranging that the courts simply have to
ignore them, lest judges overextend themselves in the cause of
racial justice.
One such case, antedating Washington v. Davis, had focused
on assistance to people in need. In the 1960s Texas operated two
big welfare programs: assistance to the elderly, and assistance to
children in poor families (AFDC). To limit the aggregate of wel-
fare spending as required by the state constitution, the legisla-
ture appropriated lump sums for each category, leaving to
administrators the final calculation of benefits. Those officials
ordered that AFDC benefits (paid to families 87% of whom were
black or Latino) be cut to 50% of need, while maintaining fund-
ing at 100% of need for aid to the aged (paid to beneficiaries
60% of whom were white). In Jefferson v. Hackney,56 the Supreme
Court, shrugging off these racial percentages as a "naked statisti-
cal argument," found no racial discrimination. If you believe
race had nothing to do with the state's behavior, I would like to
sell you the Brooklyn Bridge. When AFDC was first adopted, its
beneficiaries were mostly white widows. As the numbers of bene-
ficiaries gradually shifted toward single mothers who were dark-
skinned, all over the nation AFDC benefits declined. 57 Yet,
because the Texas legislation was formally race-neutral, the
Supreme Court could look at a governmental action that was sat-
urated with racial meaning and see only poverty.
So, if a state should adopt legislation explicitly providing bet-
ter housing, or education, or employment opportunity for white
citizens than for their black co-citizens, that would violate the
equal protection clause. But the Constitution, as now inter-
preted, offers virtually no relief against a state's "racially selective
sympathy and indifference. '58 If a city's schools remain racially
separate because they serve racially separate neighborhoods-so
the reasoning goes-the problem lies not with the school board,
but with the inability of many blacks to live in white middle class
56. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
57. During the same period, increasingly generous Social Security bene-
fits (including Medicare) virtually eliminated poverty among the elderly in
America. In the 1990s, those two federal programs for the elderly regularly cost
about twenty times the cost (to the federal government and the states combined)
of welfare (AFDC). For the 1993 figures, see HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note
46, at 8.
58. The term belongs to Paul Brest. See Paul A. Brest, The Supreme Court,
1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 7 (1976).
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neighborhoods.5" If low-income apartment housing is not availa-
ble in such a neighborhood, it is not the responsibility of local
zoning officials, who are merely seeking to protect neighborhood
tranquility and property values by insisting on single-family hous-
ing.6" The problem is the inability of poor people to meet the
prices set by "the housing market" for homes in the white, mid-
dle class areas.61 What those people need are good jobs. And, if
they do not qualify for those jobs, it is not the responsibility of an
employer-even the government as an employer.62 After all,
good jobs, especially in the modern economy, require more edu-
cation than used to be required for jobs of similar desirability.
On this view, what is needed for racial equality in "the employ-
ment market" is equal educational opportunity. But-is anyone
surprised?-neighborhoods that are economically poor are, with
rare exceptions, served by schools that are qualitatively poor.
63
Given the correlation of family wealth with race,64 a school's
quality is apt to vary greatly according to the racial composition
of its student body. In this circle of irresponsibility, we confront
a systematic governmental neglect that cannot be called benign.
Any advocate for the disadvantaged who imagined that the War-
59. For a recent decision reaffirming that racial separation of public
schools raises no constitutional claim unless it .is the result of deliberate govern-
mental discrimination, see Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
60. In Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), the Supreme Court held that
the plaintiffs, urban blacks of low income, lacked standing to challenge a sub-
urb's refusal to rezone land for low-income housing. The Court remarked that
the plaintiffs' inability to reside in the suburb was the likely "consequence of
the economics of the area housing market, rather than [the suburban officials']
illegal acts." 422 U.S. at 506.
61. In James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), the Court had dealt with a
law requiring that any low rent housing project be subjected to a local referen-
dum. Despite the common understanding among voters that "low rent hous-
ing" means housing for minorities, the Court upheld this requirement.
62. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
63. For illustrations, see Brenna B. Mahoney, Note, Children at Risk: The
Inequality of Urban Education, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 161 (1991). Christo-
pherJencks recently encapsulated this connection:
What are the effects of growing residential segregation by income?
First, it leads to increasing disparities in school quality-not only
because the tax base for local support is more unequal, but also, even
more important, because the strongest single determinant of where
able teachers choose to work is the socioeconomic mix of the students
they will be teaching.
David Ellwood & ChristopherJencks, Growing Inequality: It's Good for the Rich, But
Is It Bad for the Poor?, 54 BULL. Am. AcA). OF ARTS & SCIENCES, no. 3, 53, 59
(Spring 2001), at http://www.amacad.org/blvlivn3/blvlivn3-53.htm.
64. See MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE
WEALTH: A NEw PERSPECrIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY (1995).
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ren Court was ushering in a constitutional Millennium turned
out to be mistaken.
Here, where the Supreme Court turns a blind eye to the
public's role in perpetuating racial inequality, we see the same
collection of constitutional doctrines that produced the Court's
refusal to recognize a poor woman's right to public support for
an abortion. Three doctrines combine to deny relief: the judge-
made "state action" limitation on the Fourteenth Amendment,
65
the judge-made requirement of a showing of "purposeful" dis-
crimination, 6 and judge-made (and tunnel-visioned) definitions
of the "causation" of harm.6 7 Together, these restrictive judicial
inventions have created a doctrinal Bermuda Triangle from
which a substantial number of Americans-those who are poor,
or members of historically disadvantaged racial or ethnic minori-
ties, or both-cannot escape. What is missing here is recogni-
tion-any recognition at all-of the ways in which public and
private decisions reinforce each other in maintaining a structure
of advantage that excludes people from equal citizenship.' For
the present, then, advocates for the poor are remitted to political
remedies. Whatever one may think of the Court's normative
statement in Washington v. Davis, it has become self-validating as
a description. Any public responses to the systematic inequalities
associated with poverty-including the dilution of liberties and
the exacerbation of racial inequality-must "await legislative pre-
scription."69 Given that one glaring systematic inequality is the
distribution of political advantage, perhaps that is the end of the
matter. Perhaps the "forgotten man"7" is destined to remain
forgotten.
III. WHAT To Do UNTIL THE MILLENNIUM COMES
Then again, perhaps not. This symposium, attracting the
participation of writers across a broad political spectrum, attests
to a widely shared concern for attuning public policy to the
65. A depressing modern example is United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000), in which the Court reaffirmed-indeed, embraced-two decisions that
helped to usher in the era ofJim Crow: CivilfRights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) and
United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
66. Davis, 426 U.S. 229; Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256
(1979).
67. E.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
68. On some of the disastrous effects of the interaction of these doc-
trines, see Kenneth L. Karst, Citizenship, Race, and Marginality, 30 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 1 (1988).
69. 426 U.S. at 248.
70. The "forgotten man" is, collectively, the poor, both men and women,
in the language of politics in the 1930s.
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needs of Americans who are living in hardship.71. For all our dif-
ferences, we share the long-standing view that prizes work, and
we recognize the connections between work and respected mem-
bership in our national community. What is less clear is that this
agreement, at this level of abstraction, can serve as a foundation
for any sort of governmental action to combat poverty. In this
brief concluding essay, I offer two observations, both modest in
scope. I begin by suggesting a limiting principle that might help
a new majority of the Supreme Court to entertain the notion that
some laws excluding the poor from important benefits-contrary
to several of the Court's decisions of the past generation-do,
indeed, confront government with serious constitutional
problems. Finally, I assess the political prospects for governmen-
tal action aimed at reducing poverty, and particularly legislation
in support of the working poor.72
A Limited Judicial Role. Surely the Supreme Court will never
adopt an open-ended constitutional principle of affirmative gov-
ernmental responsibility for ending poverty. What might be
expected, however, is a modest extension of existing law. The
Court might adopt a principle that identifies a violation of the
equal protection clause when the government itself has defined a
basic necessity, but has adopted a selective response to that need,
rejecting coverage for one group without offering substantial jus-
tification for that exclusion. 3 Plyler v. Doe7 4 could be cited as an
example of this principle. In that decision the Court held invalid
a Texas law that specified an entitlement of children to free pub-
lic education, but denied the entitlement to the children of
undocumented foreign workers. 75 The Court, in theory, applied
a permissive "rational basis" standard of review, but all observers
(Justices included) now agree that, in fact, the Court insisted on
substantial justification for the state's discrimination, and found
71. At least, this concern is widely shared among the chattering classes.
72. In referring to legislation, I do not mean to ignore possibilities for
community self-help through grassroots movements. Of course, any program
aimed at economic development of a poor urban neighborhood will need
outside financing. Here, government grants are not the whole story; private
businesses and private philanthropy both have important roles to play. For a
sensitive exploration of these themes by one who draws on his own experience
as a participant-observer, see John 0. Calmore, Racialized Space and the Culture of
Segregation: "Hewing a Stone of Hope from a Mountain of Despair, "143 U. PA. L. REv.
1233 (1995).
73. I made a similar suggestion in 1988, in a widely uncited discussion.
See Karst, supra note 68, at 44-45.
74. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
75. 457 U.S. at 230.
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the law wanting.76 The heart of the principle I am suggesting is
this insistence on a truly importantjustification for a withholding
of benefits from persons who are poor.
If the Court were to apply a similarly demanding standard of
justification, surely it would have to reach a different result in a
case replicating Jefferson v. Hackney,77 when the Court-without
requiring any serious justification by the state-upheld Texas's
determination to cut welfare (AFDC) benefits to 50% of need,
while leaving aid to the elderly funded at 100% of need.78 If the
suggested principle were adopted, the Court would also have to
revisit such issues as (1) the limitation of a large family's monthly
welfare grant to a maximum of $250, even though the state's own
identification of "need" per person would require a benefit of
$296;79 (2) the denial of the costs of medical care for abortion
while paying the greater costs of medical care for childbirth, ° or
(3) dramatic differences in governmental spending per pupil on
public schools in districts that are property-rich and property-
poor."1 I do not say that the Court would be compelled to reach
opposite results in all three cases, but only that the suggested
principle, using the government's own standard of basic need as
a benchmark for equal protection analysis, would require sub-
stantial justification of the exclusion in question. In each of
those cases, the Court expressly noted that it was performing the
most permissive sort of review of the discrimination before it.
82
My own view, I concede, is that substantial justification was lack-
ing in all the cases, and that proper applications of the suggested
principle would lead to results opposed to the ones the Court
reached in years past.
Political Prospects for Anti-Poverty Legislation. A legislative advo-
cate who seeks to better conditions for Americans living in urban
neighborhoods of concentrated poverty faces three formidable
76. See generally 457 U.S. 202.
77. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
78. Id. at 551; see also supra text relating to note 57.
79. The Court upheld such a law in Dandridge v. Williams, supra note 5, in
the absence of any showing by the state of economies of family scale, or any
other serious justification for reducing the family's benefit below the level of
"need" per person, as established by state law. The figures in the text are drawn
from this case.
80. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
81. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Some
state supreme courts, examining such funding disparities and the low achieve-
ment of pupils in poor urban schools, have found violations of state constitu-
tional requirements. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990)
(finding a violation of the requirement of "thorough and efficient" education).
82. See, e.g., 411 U.S. at 40-44.
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obstacles. First, the poor mostly do not vote."3 If they are to be
mobilized as a constituency, they must be given hope that gov-
ernment will respond to their needs-and little in their experi-
ence encourages any such hope. Second, political power has
shifted decisively from the cities, with their substantial popula-
tions of racial and ethnic minorities, to the suburbs, which are
largely white.8 4 Third, legislation that directly and openly con-
fronts conditions of concentrated poverty in the core cities can-
not pass without running the gauntlet of the politics of race.
This is not to say that any and all anti-poverty policies are
politically doomed. Indeed, the most obvious and most effective
anti-poverty policy would be a strong and continuing effort to
achieve full employment, with special attention to the low-wage
labor market. As Bayard Rustin said four decades ago,85 a full
employment policy would be especially beneficial for poor black
families. The flip side of historically high unemployment rates
for black Americans (double the levels for white Americans), is
that the 1990's economic upturn produced a dramatic decrease
in black unemployment.8 6 One political advantage of a jobs pol-
icy is that it would not be explicitly targeted to black workers.
But, given the globalization of the market for low-skilled employ-
ment, creating such jobs will be no easy matter, even if the U.S.
economy is able to escape a prolonged recession.
8 7
Let no one think a jobs program could be carried through
on the cheap. For a job to be an effective substitute for public
assistance, it must be a stable, adequately paid job-that is, one
that is paid a living wage and that carries health and pension
benefits. Since the 1996 federal legislation aimed at "ending wel-
fare as we know it," significant numbers of people have moved
from welfare into some form of work, aided by the boom times of
the 1990s. This development, standing alone, should not be
news. For years, most welfare beneficiaries have been supple-
83. See generally E. SCHATrSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A
REALIST'S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 95-111 (1960); K. SHIENBAUM,
BEYOND THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION: A REASSESSMENT OF THE ROLE OF VOTING
IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS 88 (1984). Among socioeconomic influ-
ences on the propensity to vote, the most influential is level of education-
which, of course, tends to be low among the poor. RAYMOND E. WOLFINGER &
STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE, WHO VOTES? 23-25 (1980).
84. "Suburbs cast 36% of the vote in the presidential election of 1968,
48% in 1988, and a majority of the vote in the 1992 election." WILSON, supra
note 45, at 186.
85. See supra text accompanying note 53.
86. WItSON, supra note 45, at 45.
87. On the non-economic values of work, see sources cited supra note 52.
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menting their benefits by working, 8 leaving welfare when work
provides an adequate income, and returning to welfare only
when they are unable to make a go of things in the labor market
alone.89 The question, for those who left welfare in the wake of
the 1996 is whether those people are working their way out of
poverty. Up to now, the record has been spotty, with welfare offi-
cials having no idea what has happened to about half of the wel-
fare-leavers. Of the leavers who were tracked, more than half
found work, but not at wages sufficient to lift them out of pov-
erty. From about one-third to about one-half of them have suf-
fered various kinds of hardship, most notably, reducing food
intake for lack of money, and inability to pay rent or utility bills.90
The recent successes in reducing welfare rolls plainly should not
be confused with the larger goal of relieving poverty. To achieve
that goal, there will be no substitute for the creation of many,
many new jobs at wages that will support families. The latter
objective would seem to require further raising of the national
minimum wage, which stands today at a level, adjusted for infla-
tion, 24% lower than its level in 1979.91
Concurrently with an ongoing effort to maintain high levels
of employment, both Congress and the state legislatures can,
within the limits of political realism, seek to aid the working
poor.9 2 Recent survey research has shown strong public agree-
ment, across divisions of race and class, in support of programs
to help the working poor continue to work, and to make work
88. Sometimes welfare beneficiaries are working "off the books" in order
to avoid a possible termination of welfare benefits.
89. HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 46, at 46-53.
90. Pamela Loprest, Families Who Left Welfare: Who Are They and How Are
They Doing? 20-21 (Urban Inst., 1999), available at http://newfederal-
ism.urban.org /pdf/discussion 99-02.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2001); Sarah
Brauner & Pamela Loprest, Where Are They Now? What States'Studies ofPeople Who
Left Welfare Tell Us 8-9 passim (Urban Inst. Series A, No. A-32, 1999), available at
http://newfederalism. urban.org/pdf/anf32.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2001);
Arloc Sherman, et al., Welfare to What? Early Findings on Family Hardship and
Well-Being 7-20 (Children's Def. Fund, 1998), available at http://www.chil-
drensdefense.org /pdf/wfwhat.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2001).
91. Heather Boushey et al., Hardships in America: The Real Story of Working
Families 44 (Economic Policy Inst., 2001), available at http://www.epinet.org/
books/hardships.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2001).
92. For a thorough examination of such programs and a persuasive argu-
ment for their adoption, see HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 46, at 97-145,
213-25 passim. On the political attraction of "universal" aid programs, as distin-
guished from programs "targeted" at the urban poor, see Theda Skopol,
Targeting Within Universalism: Politically Viable Policies to Combat Poverty Within the
United States, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS, supra note 52, at 411. Although some
aspects of Skoopol's position have been contested, there is general agreement
that aid to the working poor can have broad appeal.
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pay. The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), allowing tax
refunds for poor families, deserves not only continued re-enact-
ment, but expansion of coverage and a relaxation of its
"phaseout" provision.93 Work-facilitating programs-notably job
training, childcare, and subsidized transportation to the work-
place-are widely supported, even at the cost of increased taxa-
tion. Or, at least, these are the views being communicated to
those who are doing opinion polls.94 It is by no means clear that
these attitudes are translatable into active grass-roots support of
such programs. Nor is it clear that the attitudes would survive
actual, as opposed to hypothetical, increases in taxes (indeed,
one wonders whether the polled citizens have any idea how
expensive decent child care is).95 But the survey research does
93. One thorough study of the political history and economic analyses of
the EITC concludes:
The overwhelming majority of economic evidence suggests that the
EITC constitutes a uniquely effective and viable anti-poverty program
.... [A]s reported by the [Council of Economic Advisors], the EITC
lifted 4.3 million persons out of poverty in 1997, including 2.2 million
children under the age of 18, more than any other government
program.
DennisJ. Ventry, Jr., The Collision of Tax and Welfare Politics: The Political History of
the Earned Income Tax Credit, 1969-1999, 53 NAT'L TAXJ. 983, 1011 (2000).
EITC began, not as a liberal benefits program, but as a work-incentive alter-
native to welfare (AFDC); its expansion in the 1990s probably helped to lay
AFDC to rest. See Edward J. McCaffery, The Burdens of Benefits, 44 VILL. L. REv.
445, 482 (1999). EITC (codified in 26 U.S.C. § 32) has always included a
"phaseout" ingredient, in which the credit is reduced by a substantial percent-
age once the earned income reaches a certain level. As AFDC died, and an
expanded EITC came to be perceived by some as a "liberal" handout, threaten-
ing noises were heard in Congress. During the 2000 election campaign, how-
ever, Governor George W. Bush made clear his support for continuation of
EITC, and in 2001, as President, he signed a tax cut bill that expanded some
benefits under EITC by increasing the income levels at which a married
couple's "phaseout" begins. The object was to soften the "marriage penalty"
that, in effect, penalized a single mother for marrying. Richard W. Stevenson,
Congress Passes Tax Cut, MILWAUKEEJOURNAL-SENTINEL, May 27, 2001, at IA. For
a skeptical view of the EITC's contributions to the working poor, see McCaffery,
supra, at 484-91. For other evaluations of EITC, see Ann L. Alstott, The Earned
Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARv. L.
REv. 533 (1995); HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 46, at 106-11; Deepak
Bhargava, A Silver Lining in Cloudy Washington, D.C. (Nat'l Campaign for Jobs
and Income Support, 2001), available at http://www.nationalcampaign.org/vic-
tory/asp (last visited Nov. 12, 2001).
94. See GILENS, supra note 13, at 187-89, 192-203.
95. According to one recent study, in all but one state the average cost of
child care in a child care center is greater than the annual tuition cost at a
public college. KATHLEEN SCHULMAN ET AL., THE HIGH COST OF CHILD CARE
PUTS QUALITY CARE OUT OF REACH FOR MANY FAMILIES (Children's Def. Fund,
2000). In a social-accounting perspective, however, the total cost of decent
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suggest that, if a group of legislators-white legislators, we might
hope-can be persuaded to take the initiative for such programs,
they will be safe from the most virulent form of voter resentment,
the race-based resentment that has infected the welfare issue for
a generation.
For the present, the prospects do not seem bright for the
change of heart among the Justices that would permit the mod-
est expansion I have suggested for the reach of the equal protec-
tion clause. Nor, in the near future, should we expect adoption
of the legislative programs I have mentioned-with the excep-
tion of the expanded (but ever vulnerable) Earned Income Tax
Credit.96 But it seems reasonable to continue to offer sugges-
tions, especially suggestions so modest as these, even though
today's judicial and political environments may be unreceptive.97
Times change. In 1940, who would have predicted Brown v.
Board of Education98 or the Civil Rights Act of 1964?99
childcare is more than repaid by the long-term savings associated with increased
educational attainment and the eventual adult earnings of those children. See
CONSTANCE F. CURRIE & ROBERT T. MICHAEL, MEASURING PovERT. A NEW
APPROACH (1995).
96. If we should confront a prolonged economic downturn, another pos-
sible exception might be something resembling a full employment policy.
97. Here I follow William Julius Wilson, supra note 45, at 208, who noted
that his suggested policy framework was "not constrained by an awareness of the
current political climate in the United States."
98. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
99. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (1995).
